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THE REVISORY POWER OF COURTS OVER
JUDGMENTS BY DEFAULT IN THIRD
PARTY PRACTICE
Associated Transport v. Bonoumo'
Appellant's tractor-trailer and appellee's automobile collided. Passengers in appellee's car were injured and later
brought suit against appellant in Baltimore City. Appellant,
before pleading, moved for leave to make appellee a third
party defendant. Leave was granted and appellant filed a
third party complaint under Section 27 of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,2 now superseded by
the General Rules of Practice and Procedure.' Appellee, a
resident of Philadelphia, was served under Art. 66 , Sec.
106, by service on the Secretary of State and notice by
registered mail, but he failed to make his defense within
the time required and on October 8, 1947, a judgment by
default was entered against him and in favor of the appellant. On December 3, 1947, more than thirty days after
the entry of the judgment by default, appellee filed a petition to strike out said default judgment, and on December
24, 1947, after a hearing, an order was entered which
granted appellee's petition. On February 18, 1948, verdicts
were rendered, one for the passengers against appellant
and the other in favor of appellee on the third party complaint. On February 24, 1948, judgments were entered
thereon. An appeal was entered on March 17, 1948, by
appellant, from the judgment in favor of appellee, on the
ground that the order of December 24, 1947, striking out
the judgment by default, was improper since it was rendered after the judgment by default had become enrolled
and beyond the discretionary powers of the court.
The ordinary rule that after the term at which a judgment is rendered, or after thirty days in Baltimore City,
the judgment becomes enrolled and cannot properly be
stricken out in the absence of fraud, surprise, deceit or
irregularity applies to judgments by default." Thus, if a
' 62 A. 2d 281 (Md. 1948).
2Md. Laws (1941) Ch. 344, Md. Laws (1947) Ch. 717, Md. Code Supp.
(1947) Art. 50, Sec. 27.
1 General Rules of Practice and Procedure, Part Two, III, Joinder of
Parties and Claims; Third Party Practice, Rule 7(4), Md. Code Supp.
(1947) 2044.
' Armour Fertilizer Works v. Brown, 185 Md. 273, 277, 44 A. 2d 753 (1945);
PoE, PRACTICE (Tiffany Ed.) Secs. 392, 393.
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motion to strike a default judgment is made during the
period before enrollment and is granted, since it was still
within the discretionary power of the court, the plaintiff
may not appeal;5 but, if the motion is not made until after
the default judgment has become enrolled, then plaintiff
may appeal "and the propriety of the order appealed from
will be determined by the existence or not, in point of fact,
of the fraud, surprise, deceit or irregularity complained of".6
However, if the motion to strike is denied, defendant may
appeal whether the motion was made before or after enrollment.7 When the court in the instant case said, "from
an order striking out a judgment by default (not made
final by inquisition) a plaintiff 'undoubtedly has a right of
appeal',"' it doubtless meant to limit this statement to apply
only to cases where the motion was made after enrollment.
In both cases upon which the court relied in stating this
rule, the motions were made after enrollment.9
However, the court held that the ordinary rules do not
apply to the instant case saying, "a 'judgment by default'
in a third party action for contribution cannot become enrolled, or beyond the discretionary powers of the court to
strike it out, before judgment in the original action". If the
ordinary rules apply to this case, reasoned the court, then
appellant's appeal, which was not filed until more than
thirty days from the order striking the enrolled judgment
by default, would have been too late. The court then
pointed out that the purpose of Section 27 is to prevent a
multiplicity of suits and to this end it allows a defendant
to litigate his action for contribution together with the
original action and makes it unnecessary for him to seek
contribution in a separate proceeding after the termination
of the original action. But it does not intend to permit a
party to receive a contingent judgment for contribution,
before judgment in the original action - "a complete inversion of the former order of procedure" is not allowed.
What would have been the disposition of the case had
it been instituted after the effective date of the General
Rules of Practice and Procedure relating to "Third Party
Practice"? 0 The Rules provide in part:
'Townshend v. Chew. 31 Md. 247 (1869); Craig v. Wroth, 47 Md. 281
(1877) ; POE, supra, n. 4, Sees. 389, 391.
I PoE, supra, n. 4, Sec. 390.
'Eddy v. Summers, 183 Md. 683, 689, 39 A. 2d 812 (1944) ; POE, supra,
n. 4, Sec. 391.
Supra, n. 1, 283.
'Armour Fertilizer Works v. Brown, supra, n. 4, 278; Henderson v. Gibson, 19 Md. 234, 238 (1862).
"oJanuary 1, 1948.
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"Judgment Upon Multiple Claims.
"(a) When Entered. When more than one claim
for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon
one or more but less than all of the claims only upon
an express determination that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry
of judgment. In the absence of such determinationand
direction any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims
shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims.11
"(b) Stay of Judgment. When a court has ordered
a final judgment on some but not all of the claims presented in the action, the court may stay enforcement
of that judgment until the entering of a subsequent
judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to
the party in whose favor the judgment is entered."' 2
Thus, it appears the new Rules expressly require the
same result as that reached in the instant case. Furthermore, the provision which allows the court to "direct the
entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than
all the claims.. ." does not seem to be susceptible of application to cases, such as this one, where the liability as well
as the extent thereof is dependent upon the outcome of the
original proceedings.
It is appropriate here to note that the period of time
preceding enrollment has been changed by the new Rules.
Formerly a judgment, including a judgment by default, became enrolled at the end of the term at which it was entered or in thirty days in Baltimore City, but the new Rule
was meant to provide that a judgment, decree, or any other
judicial act, does not become enrolled until the expiration
of the term at which it was entered or thirty days, whichever time is longer. No differentiation is made between
Baltimore City and the rest of the state. The Rule reads:
Italics supplied.
Supra, n. 3, Rule 6, Md. Code Supp. (1947) 2043.
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"Revisory Power of Courts Over Judgments,
Orders and Decrees.
"Courts shall have for a period of thirty (30) days
after the doing of any act or thing in any cause the same
revisory power and control over such act or thing
which they have had under the practice heretofore
existing, or which they had under practice existing
prior to the adoption of a special provision of any Public
Local Law herewith superseded, during the term at
which it was done, and no more; and after thirty (30)
days from the doing of any such act or thing or after the
expiration of the term at which it was done, whichever
time is longer, courts shall have the same revisory
power and control as they have had under practice
heretofore existing, or which they had under practice
existing prior to the adoption of a special provision of
any Public Local Law herewith superseded, after the
term at which it was done, and no more."' 3
The rule as written requires clarification since a literal
interpretation of the language used means that if a term
had more than thirty days to run after the entry of judgment, then as to the period between thirty days after judgment and the end of the term the rule fails to provide the
courts with any revisory power of any kind. Obviously this
is not intended. The purpose of the Rule, as described in
the Reporter's notes, 4 could be clearly stated with the
above ambiguity avoided, as for example:
For a period of thirty (30) days after the doing of
any act or thing in any action, or during the term at
which it was done, whichever time is longer, the court
shall have the same revisory power and control over
Supra. n. 3, VI, Revisory Power of Courts Over Judgments, Orders, and
Decrees, Rule 1. Md. Code Supp. (1947) 2047. This rule purports to apply
in both law and equity and contains a provision stating its effect on existing
laws and rules, yet no mention is made of General Equity Rule No. 48 which
provides that all final decrees and orders in the nature of final decrees are
considered enrolled from and after thirty days from date. This is inconsistent with the instant rule which purports to say that final decrees do
not become enrolled until after the expiration of the term or thirty days,
whichever period of time is longer. Quaere: Is General Equity Rule No. 48
revoked by part 2 of the instant rule which expressly states that it supersedes "any other statutes and rules of court to the extent inconsistent with
this rule"?
"General Rules of Practice and Procedure, Explanatory Notes, Second
Report, III, Revisory Power of Courts Over Judgments, Decrees and Orders,
Md. Code Supp. (1947) 2117.
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such act or thing as it had during the term at which
it was done under the practice existing before adoption
of this rule or before the enactment of any Public Local
Law herewith superseded; thereafter, the court shall
have the same revisory power and control over such act
or thing as it had after expiration of the term at which
it was done under the practice existing before the adoption of this rule or before the enactment of any Public
Local Law herewith superseded.
TIME FOR RECORDING CHATTEL MORTGAGES
IN MARYLAND
Baltimore Bankers Corp. v. Peters Auto
Body & Spring Works'
Appellant, in consideration of the execution of a chattel
mortgage on a truck, loaned the Mortgagor $528.00 on October 3, 1947. This mortgage was not recorded until October
14, 1947. The Appellee, a garageman, had been in possession
of the truck for purposes of making repairs at the time of
sale and mortgage on October 3rd. On the day of the making of the mortgage, the Mortgagor took the truck from the
garage to the place of business of the Appellant loan company where it was inspected preparatory to the execution
of the mortgage. Upon this surrender, the loan company
based its contention that the lien for repairs was waived
under the wording of Section 41, Article 63, of the Maryland Code. The Court, however, found that the repairs on
the truck were not begun until October 6, 1947 - three days
after the mortgagor displayed the truck to the mortgagee,
and that these repairs were substantially completed at the
time of the recording of the mortgage on October 14th.
Tferefore, since the lien did not attach until the repairs
began, there could be no waiver or extinguishment of the
garage's claim as no lien had attached on October 3rd-the
date of the garage's temporary surrender, but attached on
October 6th when the garage again had possession and work
was begun. There is no indication that the garage had
actual knowledge of the mortgage; also, it cannot be said
that the loan company relied upon the work of the garage
in granting the mortgage since no repairs had been made
at the time of the mortgage. From the time the repairs
began until the sale by a trustee appointed by the court,
the possession of the truck remained in the hands of the
1 69 A. 2d 491 (Md. 1949).

